Empirical studies have consistently shown that punitive damages are rarely awarded, with rates of about 3 to 5 percent of plaintiff trial wins. Using the 2005 data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Civil Justice Survey, this article shows that knowing in which cases plaintiffs sought punitive damages transforms the picture of punitive damages. Not accounting for whether punitive damages were sought obscures the meaningful punitive damages rate, the rate of awards in cases in which they were sought, by a factor of nearly 10, and obfuscates a more explicable pattern of awards than has been reported. Punitive damages were surprisingly infrequently sought, with requests found in about 10 percent of tried cases that plaintiffs won. State laws restricting access to punitive damages were significantly associated with rates of seeking punitive damages. Punitive damages were awarded in about 30 percent of the plaintiff trial wins in which they were sought. Awards were most frequent in cases of intentional tort, with a punitive award rate of over 60 percent. Greater harm corresponded to a greater probability of an award: the size of the compensatory award was significantly associated with whether punitive damages were awarded, with a rate of approximately 60 percent for cases with compensatory awards of $1 million or more. Regression models correctly classify about 70 percent or more of the punitive award request outcomes. Judge-jury differences in the rate of awards exist, with judges awarding punitive damages at a higher rate in personal injury cases and juries awarding them at a higher rate in nonpersonal injury cases. These puzzling adjudicator differences may be a consequence of the routing of different cases to judges and juries.
INTRODUCTION 1
Two major questions about punitive damages are whether they will be awarded and, if awarded, what their amount will be. The amount of punitive damages awarded has been consistently, successfully modeled as a function of the compensatory award.
2 But models of whether punitive damages are awarded have been less successful in explaining the pattern of awards. This is because punitive damages are rarely awarded (Eisenberg et al. 2006) , and rare events can be difficult to model. Studies spanning a decade show that plaintiffs receive punitive awards in about 3 to 5 percent of cases they win, with the rate noticeably higher in financial injury cases.
3
Studies also suggest that when punitive damages are awarded, they tend to be awarded in appropriate cases (Antolini 2004, 210-211; Koenig & Rustad 2001 , 1995 . But only marginal additional insight has been gained into whether punitive damages will be awarded.
2
A limitation of most prior punitive damages studies is the absence of information about whether punitive damages were requested. An important data set from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) allows fuller exploration of whether punitive damages will be awarded. The data set, which consists of civil trials concluded in 156 counties in 2005, is the fourth in the NCSC-BJS series of Civil Justice Surveys dating back to cases terminated in 1991-1992. In the 2005 iteration, the survey added a variable that recorded whether punitive damages were sought.
3
This single additional variable has opened the curtain on the rate at which punitive damages are awarded to an unprecedented extent. It enables us to provide the first large-study insight into the rate at which punitive damages were sought in tried cases. The rate, about 10 percent, is much lower than many have believed. In tried cases in which punitive damages were sought, and in which plaintiffs established liability at trial, punitive damages were not rarely awarded. They were awarded in 35.5 percent (28.5 percent weighted 4 ) of cases won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. This contrasts sharply with the 3 to 5 percent rate in cases won by plaintiffs, not filtered by whether punitive damages were sought. The obvious importance of whether punitive damages were sought requires reassessing the factors associated with requesting and receiving punitive damages. We find that the award of punitive damages is significantly associated with the level of the compensatory award. For compensatory award cases exceeding $1 million, won by plaintiffs with punitive damages requested, the punitive damages award rate exceeded 50 percent. The rate is also sensitive to case category and varies across judge and jury trials. Judges award punitive damages at a greater rate in personal injury trials and juries award them at a greater rate in nonpersonal injury trials.
4
Part 2 of this article first echoes speculation about the rate at which punitive damages would be sought and then reviews prior findings with respect to the rate of seeking and obtaining punitive damages. Part 3 describes the relevant aspects of the 2005 Civil Justice Survey and reports our core results. Part 4 seeks to explain the pattern of punitive awards as a function of case category, locale, level of compensatory award, propensity to seek punitive awards, and mode of trial. Part 5 discusses the results and Part 6 concludes.
EXPECTATIONS ABOUT PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS AND PRIOR STUDIES THAT ACCOUNTED FOR WHETHER PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE SOUGHT 5
Conversations with colleagues yielded estimates that plaintiffs would be observed to have sought punitive damages in nearly every case. ''Just throw the allegation into the complaint.'' ''It can't hurt.'' ''Malpractice not to do so.'' Some of these reactions were from highly experienced teachers of civil procedure. These estimates may have been informed by George Priest's 1996 study of three small Alabama counties, conducted in connection with litigation, that reported punitive damages claims in over 70 percent of tort claims in the early 1990s (Priest 1996, 827-828) , 5 a rate that, as far as we can ascertain, has not been replicated in other published studies. The Priest study did not report the rate at which plaintiffs were granted punitive damages.
6
In reviewing the literature, we found no prior multi-jurisdiction broadbased study that assessed punitive damage award rates in light of the rate at which punitive damages were sought. But, in addition to the Priest study, some prior locale-specific or subject-specific studies do provide useful background results related to this study. The prior studies' patterns of results highlight the importance of carefully tracking what cases are included in the calculation of punitive award rates and requests.
7
Using a Florida jury verdict reporter database available via Westlaw, Vidmar and Rose (2001) studied punitive damages awards in Florida from 1989 to 1998. They gathered information on whether punitive damages were submitted to the jury and, if they were, whether the jury awarded punitive damages. Table 1 reproduces the relevant table from their work. The column labeled ''Number of Cases'' is ''the total number of punitive damage claims between 1989 and 1998 that were put to a jury,'' while the column labeled ''Number with Non-Zero Awards'' reports ''the number and percentage of times that the jury returned a punitive award'' (Vidmar & Rose 2001, 492-493) .
8
Punitive damages awards were common in cases in which the issue of punitive damages was submitted to juries. The table's last row shows that, over the course of a decade, the possibility of punitive damages was submitted to juries in an average of 23.2 cases per year, and that juries awarded punitive damages in an average of 20.8 of those cases per year. This is an overall average of punitive damages being awarded when submitted in 89.7 percent of cases.
9
David Baldus, John MacQueen, and George Woodworth used ''published sources, e.g., the West Reporting System, Westlaw, Lexis, legal treatises, and national jury verdict reporters'' to report on medical liability cases involving ''116 plaintiffs who sought punitive damages against health care provider defendants' ' (1995, 1113-1114 n. 3, 1156) . Punitive damages were awarded in 88 of the 116 cases, or 76 percent. Punitive damages were awarded in 10 cases in which courts later ruled they were inappropriately given. The study included 32 states and 24 percent of the cases were prior to 1980 (Baldus, MacQueen, & Woodworth 1995 , 1114 -1115 3).
Neil Vidmar's book (1995) on medical malpractice provides additional insight into the rate of punitive awards in medical malpractice cases. The book reports on 895 medical malpractice cases in North Carolina for the period July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1987 and, for 14 North Carolina counties, 326 medical malpractice cases from July 1, 1987 to December 31, 1990 . Vidmar reports that 17 of 84 cases that went to trial resulted in wins for plaintiffs in the 1984-1987 study and that four of 25 cases that went to trial resulted in wins for plaintiffs in the 1987-1990 study (1995, 23, 25) . Therefore, in the combined sample, plaintiffs won 21 tried cases. Punitive damages were reportedly sought in 27 percent of the cases that went to trial (Vidmar 1995, 56) . Punitive damages were thus sought in 27 percent of 109 cases, or 29 cases that went to trial. Since plaintiffs won 21 of 109 cases, or 19.3 percent of trials, one might estimate that 19.3 percent of the 29 tried cases in which punitive damages were sought resulted in plaintiff wins. (This assumes that the plaintiff win rate is not materially different between tried cases in which punitive damages were sought and tried cases in which they were not sought.) That is five to six cases. The North Carolina study further reports that two jury verdicts of the estimated five or six cases resulted in punitive damages awards (Vidmar 1995, 254) . So approximately 40 percent (two of five) or 33 percent (two of six) of the tried North Carolina cases that requested punitive damages awards resulted in such awards.
Denise Antolini used a personal injury judgments reporter to study punitive damages cases in Hawaii from 1985 Hawaii from to 2001 Hawaii from (2004 . 6 The study purported to examine ''the complete universe of 2,250 state and federal tort judgments in Hawaii from 1985 to 2001, which produced sixty-three punitive damages judgments'' (Antolini 2004, 157) . The publisher of the verdict reporter, ''personally reviews the judgment books in the U.S. District Court and the State Circuit Courts each month'' (Antolini 2004, 212) . Plaintiffs requested punitive damages in a little more than onethird of the reported tort cases. Request rates ranged ''from an annual high of 59.46% in 1988 to an annual low of 23.08% in 1989 . the mean annual request rate was 37.14%, and the annual median was 37.04%'' (Antolini 2004, 221) . 7 The request rate varied by case forum. Punitive damages were requested in about 37 percent of all state court judgments reported, in 15 percent of all Court Annexed Arbitration Program (CAAP) awards reported, and in 43 percent of federal court judgments (Antolini 2004, 220) . Antolini also reports that punitive damages were awarded in state court in 13.65 percent of the cases, in the CAAP in 8.39 percent of the cases, and in federal court in 6.61 percent of the cases (Antolini 2004, 224-225) . If we crudely assume that punitive damages were requested at the same rate in successful and unsuccessful cases, which is a reasonable assumption based on the Bureau of Justice Statistics data described below, then state court cases yielded punitive awards in 13.65/37, or 37 percent of cases in which they were requested, CAAP cases yielded punitive awards in 8.39/15, or 56 percent of cases in which they were requested, and federal courts yielded punitive awards in 6.61/43, or 15 percent of cases in which they were requested.
actual records. They studied over 25,000 tort cases from six Georgia counties covering a period of four years. Punitive damages were sought in 3,729 cases of 25,562 cases, or 14.7 percent of the total (Eaton, Mustard, & Talarico 2005, 345, 352 (2004, 220) . The higher Hawaii rates may be attributable to a less comprehensive sample than in Eaton, Mustard, and Talarico, and a sample dominated by cases reaching judgment.
13
A 1996 Pacific Research Institute study of one month of lawsuits filed in San Francisco County assessed 1,015 suits. Punitive damages were requested in 14 percent of the suits, and in 27 percent of the suits that the author deemed to conceivably involve a punitive award (Hayward 1996) . A study of over 3,000 filings in 1995-1996 in four California counties, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Joaquin, and Sacramento, found punitive damages claim rates ranging from 9 percent in actions against individuals in cases filed in San Joaquin County to 60 percent in actions against governments in San Diego County (Sullivan 1997) . The study does not report sufficient information to compute overall rates at which punitive damages were sought. Table 2 summarizes the prior literature on punitive damages summarized here. Panel A summarizes studies reporting the rate at which punitive damages were sought. Panel B summarizes studies reporting the rate at which punitive damages were awarded at trial, conditional on punitive damages having been sought.
DATA USED IN THIS STUDY AND CORE RESULTS

The Data 15
The data for this study come from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, an NCSC-BJS project that has so far yielded four major datasets. The Civil Justice Survey gathers data directly from state court clerks' offices on tort, contract, and property cases disposed of by trial in fiscal year 1991-1992 and in calendar years 1996, 2001, and 2005 . Each of these time periods corresponds to a separate BJS data set. The first three datasets covered state courts of general jurisdiction in a random sample of One important limitation of the data should be noted. The coding of whether punitive damages were sought was based on an ex post reading of the case files and not on observing what issues were in fact submitted to adjudicators. Documents in the file, such as the complaint, were reviewed for mention of punitive damages. If punitive damages were mentioned in a document suggesting that they had been sought, they were coded as having been sought. But the data do not allow assessing whether a punitive claim was in fact submitted to the judge or jury as fact-finder. Thus, if a punitive claim were included in the complaint, but dismissed 8 One county included in the 1991-1992 and 1996 study, Norfolk, Massachusetts, fell out the nation's 75 most populous in the 2000 census and was replaced by Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, and El Paso County, Texas. Two Maryland counties declined to participate in the 1991-1992 study, and were replaced with Fairfax County for all three iterations of the Civil Justice Survey. For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics (1995, 1996, & 2004) . The initial Civil Justice Survey dataset (1991) (1992) includes only jury trials. The two subsequent datasets, 1996 and 2001, include jury and bench trials. The three datasets include all completed trials in all three years in most of the counties. on summary judgment before reaching the jury, the data coded punitive damages as having been sought. This leads the models estimating whether punitive damages were awarded to be conservative. Since punitive damages were sought in all the cases we code as having resulted in a punitive award, the positive punitive damages outcomes would not change. But some of the negative punitive damages outcomes are false negatives in that the jury could not have awarded punitive damages because the issue was not submitted to the jury. Thus, our estimates of the rates at which adjudicators awarded punitive damages, conditional on their being sought, are conservatively low. Table 3 reports, by case category, the percent of all trials in which punitive damages were sought, the percent of all trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought, and the percent of trials in which punitive damages were awarded, conditional on plaintiffs having sought punitive damages and prevailed at trial. The overall rates are surprisingly low. The table's first two columns show that seeking punitive damages is not very common in cases that reach trial. In no case category did plaintiffs seek punitive damages in as high a rate as 40 percent of trials.
10 And the overall rate for all trials was 9.0 percent.
19
Plaintiffs sought punitive damages in only 10.2 percent of the trials they won, not strikingly different from the 9.0 percent rate in all trials. These figures increase to 11.5 percent and 13.1 percent, respectively, if one uses probability weights to account for the different numbers of cases represented by the large and small county samples. The rate is somewhat depressed by the large motor vehicle category. Excluding motor vehicle cases, plaintiffs sought punitive damages in 398 of 2,768 trials they won, or 14.4 percent, which increases to 17.6 percent if one accounts for the sample design using probability weights. The table shows substantial heterogeneity across case categories. If one separates judge and jury trials, plaintiffs sought punitive damages in 9.3 percent (11.0 percent weighted) of judge-tried cases they won and 10.6 percent (14.1 percent weighted) of jury-tried cases they won. Table 4 shows, now subdivided by locale, the same information as Table  3 : the rate at which punitive damages were sought for all trials, the rate at which they were sought in plaintiff wins, and the rate at which they were awarded when plaintiffs won at trial. The table treats as a single locale the 110 smaller counties not in the core Civil Justice Survey group of 46 large counties.
21
Both the mean and the median seeking rates, across the 47 locales, are less than 10 percent of all trials. In two counties (Santa Clara and Fulton), both with relatively few trials, the rate exceeded 30 percent. In seven additional counties, the rate exceeded 20 percent. Four of those counties, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Franklin, and Fairfax, had more than 100 trials. Note. Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were sought in all trials, the rate at which punitive damages were sought in trials won by plaintiffs, and the rate at which punitive damages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. Source. NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey. Note. Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were sought in all trials, the rate at which punitive damages were sought in trials won by plaintiffs, and the rate at which punitive damages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
In 21 counties, the rate was less than 5 percent but three of these counties are in states that preclude or substantially constrain the award of punitive damages. The last two columns in Tables 3 and 4 show that, in trials won by plaintiffs in which they sought punitive damages, the overall rate at which punitive damages were awarded was 35.5 percent. Accounting for the differential sampling of large and small counties yields an overall rate of 28.5 percent. These rates differ substantially from rates based on punitive awards in trials won by plaintiffs that do not account for whether punitive damages were sought. Since the tables' middle two numerical columns show punitive requests in only about 10 percent of plaintiff trial wins, failure to account for whether punitive damages were sought could be viewed as misstating the punitive damages award rate-the rate at which they are awarded when sought-by about a factor of 10.
EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF PUNITIVE AWARDS 23
This dramatic change requires reassessing previous findings about punitive damages in light of the newly available information about whether punitive damages were sought. We address the following topics: (1) the relation between state law and the seeking rate, (2) the relation between case category and locale and the likelihood of award, (3) the relation between the size of the compensatory award and the likelihood of a punitive award, (4) whether rates of punitive awards differed between judges and juries and between personal injury and nonpersonal injury cases, and (5) whether the rate at which punitive damages were awarded was associated with the rate at which they were sought. We first explore these variables separately and then explore them simultaneously in two classes of regression models. The first class of models, which examines whether punitive damages were awarded, includes only cases in which punitive damages were sought and plaintiffs won at trial. The second class of models first models the selection process leading to a request for punitive damages, including state regulation of punitive damages, and assesses whether punitive damages were awarded conditional on this selection process.
State Law and the Rate of Seeking Punitive Damages 24
At least two features of state law that we can account for can be expected to influence whether punitive damages are sought. First is the set of legal rules regulating the availability of punitive damages. For example, if state law prohibits punitive damages, the rate at which they are sought should be very low or even zero. Second is the incentive structure influencing attorneys who might seek punitive awards. In states where permitted, requesting punitive damages may, in a first approximation, appear to be near costless, requiring only the addition of words to a complaint. But some costs nevertheless likely exist. An attorney's loss of reputation with a judge may be a consequence of thoughtless punitive damages requests, and monetary penalties for frivolous claims can put a hard edge on the reputational blow. We assess these features with the primary goal of exploring their influence on the rate of seeking punitive awards. This lays the groundwork for the selection models explored in Part 4.6.
State Rules Limiting the Seeking of Punitive Damages
25
Plaintiffs generally cannot recover punitive damages unless they seek them, and state laws differ in allowing plaintiffs to seek punitive damages. In four states, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington, it is generally accepted that punitive damages are not allowed. 12 Even in these states, however punitive claims can appear in cases through the application Leave of court must be sought to allow an amendment to the complaint to seek punitive damages. Thus, courts in these seven states preliminarily assess the merits of a punitive damages claim before punitive damages can even be sought. We expect that punitive damages will be sought less often in these 14 states. Each of these states other than New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, and South Dakota have some trials in the NCSC-BJS data.
26
To explore the relation between state law characteristics (prohibitions on punitives, limitations on punitives, and pleading threshold for punitives) and punitive damages outputs, Table 5 reports the rates of seeking and obtaining punitive damages by state. States with less than 100 trials in the NCSC-BJS data are combined in the table into the residual category ''Other.'' Each state in the table is represented by at least two counties in the data.
27
For states that we treat as generally prohibiting punitive damages, only Washington is displayed in the table. New Hampshire has no cases in the data and Louisiana and Nebraska each have less than 100 trials in the data. Combining Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington as a group yields a punitive damages seeking rate of 2.27 percent (5 out of 220 trials), which is statistically significantly lower than the 9.13 percent rate in other states (p < 0.001). If one limits the sample to cases in which plaintiffs won at trial, the three states have a seeking rate of If one combines the states with rules or statutory restrictions on punitive damages (no punitive damages, restrictions on punitive damages, threshold pleading requirement), punitive damages were sought in such states in 2.59 percent (61 out of 2,351) of trials compared to 11.31 percent (718 out of 6,350) trials in other states. Weighting the analysis to reflect the differential sampling of large and small counties results in restriction states having a seeking rate of 3.72 percent and other states having a seeking rate of 13.71 percent. If one limits the sample to cases in which plaintiffs won at trial, the restricting states have a seeking rate of 3.31 percent (40 out of 1,208 trials), with corresponding weighted rates of 3.60 percent and 15.45 percent, respectively. We conclude that state rules restricting punitive damages are significantly associated with the rate at which punitive damages are sought. This filtering mechanism is accounted for below in our second set of regression models of whether plaintiffs obtain punitive damages after trial.
State Sanction Standards
31
In addition to statutory limits on seeking punitive damages, state law or practice may affect the seeking of punitive damages in other ways. Plaintiffs with weak or marginal punitive damages claims may hesitate to seek them for at least two reasons. First, an attorney who brings an objectively weak punitive damages claims may fear a possible reputational loss with the judge. The punitive damages claim will not only be denied but the judge may treat other aspects of the attorney's case with greater skepticism. Second, the attorney may fear the less subtle risk of being sanctioned for having brought a frivolous claim. We cannot assess the first factor but we can attempt to account for possible fear of sanctions by exploiting variation in state law.
32
Following Byron Keeling's (1994) classification system of state law sanctions, we divide the states into three tiers. One tier consists of states with a high threshold for awarding sanctions. ''Typically, the states that follow a high threshold sanctions model require some kind of subjective bad faith-or the absence of good faith-as a condition to an award of sanctions . .'' Other factors being equal, this tier might be expected to have the highest rate of seeking punitive damages. Another tier consists of states with a low threshold for awarding sanctions. ''[U]nder a sanctions scheme in a low threshold state, a person can be subject to sanctions if she acts unreasonably-regardless whether she acts in subjective bad faith.'' Other factors being equal, these states might be expected to have the lowest rate of seeking punitive damages. A third tier consists of states with a hybrid threshold for sanctions, a threshold that falls between the high threshold and the low threshold states. ''States that follow this model preserve an objective standard for the imposition of sanctions, but nonetheless, they incorporate into their sanctions schemes one or more procedural devices intended to mitigate the repressive effects of the objective standard'' (Keeling 1994 (Keeling , 1095 (Keeling , 1103 (Keeling , 1111 . We start with Keeling's original classification of states but update it to reflect changes in law since publication of his article in 1994. These changes consist mostly of states that have since adopted the 1993 version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which reduced the perceived chilling effect on advocacy of the 1983 version of Rule 11. 20 We recognize that for some states, classification is a judgment call and alternative classification may be reasonable.
21
This three-tier classification scheme leads to states' sanction regimes being classified for purposes of this article as shown in the text note accompanying Table 6 . The numerical columns in the table show the rates of seeking and obtaining punitive awards, with weighted results in parentheses.
34
The weighted results for the relation between sanctions and seeking punitive damages suggest that the high threshold states noticeably differ from the hybrid and low threshold states but that no meaningful difference exists between the hybrid threshold and low threshold states. As expected, plaintiffs seek punitive damages at a higher rate in states with a high threshold for awarding sanctions than in states with a hybrid threshold or a low threshold. The rate in high threshold states is about double that in hybrid states. Although the weighted rate of seeking punitive damages is, surprisingly, higher in low threshold states than in hybrid threshold states, the difference is not statistically significant. 22 The rate of obtaining punitive awards in cases won by plaintiffs does not significantly differ across the three thresholds. We will account for the possible filtering effect of sanction standards in regression models below. Table 3 's last two columns show heterogeneity by case category in whether punitive damages sought are awarded. In case categories with at least ten trials in which punitive damages were sought, award rates varied from 20 percent in motor vehicle, premises liability, and seller plaintiff cases (7.1 percent, 10.7 percent, and 9.3 percent, respectively, weighted) to over 60 percent in intentional tort (66.3 percent weighted), slander/libel/ defamation (hereinafter ''defamation'') (54.7 percent weighted), and conversion (27.3 percent weighted) cases. For the case categories with at least 10 requests for punitive damages in successful trials, a test of the hypothesis that the rate of punitive awards does not vary across category can be rejected at p < 0.001. Intentional tort, the high-rate category with the largest number of trials, obviously has an element of willful misbehavior that would be expected to support requests for punitive damages awards. Defamation, another high-rate category, need not be intentional but we sus-22 The low sanctions threshold category has eight states but two, Georgia and Virginia, dominate the category. Those two states combine for 356 of the 442 (85.3 percent) low sanction threshold trials in the data. Eaton's survey of Georgia judges provides mixed evidence about the rate of frivolous litigation (and thus indirectly about potentially sanctionable behavior). Eaton reports that more than 79 percent of the judges surveyed report not seeing many frivolous cases but that 10 percent report that more than 20 percent of tort cases are frivolous (2007, 446) .
Case Category and Locale 35
pect that plaintiffs upset enough to sue for defamation tend to ascribe intentional misbehavior to the targeted defendants. The low-rate categories, such as motor vehicle, premises liability, and seller plaintiff, do not clearly consistently involve egregious behavior warranting punitive damages and so the seeking of punitive damages in them is an important possible signal about individual cases in those case categories.
36
We will further address case categories in this Part below by subdividing them by judge and jury trials. We will also account for case categories in Part 4's regression models by using dummy variables for case categories, though some reaggregation is necessary for case categories with relatively few cases. Table 4 shows that punitive damage award rates varied by locale. It is desirable to account for locale in modeling punitive damages awards. But further subdividing the sample within locale by, for example, case category or compensatory award level, is not useful. This is because the within-locale data are too thin to support further meaningful subdivision. Table 4 shows that only three locales, Los Angeles, Orange, and Fairfax, had more than 20 plaintiff trial wins with punitive requests. And the residual locale of 110 smaller counties had only 97 punitive damages award requests in plaintiff trial wins. The many locales and thinness of the data also make it impracticable to include in Part 4's regression models dummy variables for each locale. We will instead account for locale (and state) using random intercept models for our core results in Part 4.6.
37
Size of Compensatory Award 38
Greater harm can be expected to be associated with an increased likelihood of a punitive award (Choi & Eisenberg 2009 ). Table 7 reports the relation between the compensatory award and the rate of seeking and obtaining punitive awards in plaintiff trial wins. The table's first column stratifies the sample by levels of the compensatory award. The table's next column shows a generally increasing rate of seeking punitive damages as the compensatory award increased. The numbers not in parentheses show the raw data and the numbers in parentheses show results weighted to account for the differential sampling of large and small counties, a formatting convention followed in the tables that follow as well. The two lowest compensatory award levels had the lowest rates of seeking punitive damages, about 8 percent (14.1 percent and 9.5 percent, weighted). The two highest levels had seeking rates of about 20 percent or higher (24.3 percent and 28.5 percent, weighted). With respect to the rate of obtaining punitive awards, the table's last two columns show a general pattern of increasing rates of punitive awards as the compensatory award increases. The rate does not exceed 30 percent for compensatory award groups of less than $100,000 (less than $75,000 weighted). The rate increases to over 50 percent (56.3 percent weighted) for cases with compensatory awards of $1 million to $10 million and exceeds 80 percent (89.8 percent weighted) for cases with compensatory awards of at least $10 million.
Judge-Jury Differences 39
Differences in punitive damages awards rates between judges and juries have been previously reported using Civil Justice Survey data (Eisenberg et al. 2006 ). The 2005 data allow a more refined assessment of that issue based on knowledge of punitive award requests. Tables 3 and 7 suggest the importance of accounting for case category and size of compensatory award rates. Table 8 refines Table 3 by dividing the case category punitive award rates by judge and jury trials. It limits the case categories to those with at least five trials before judges and five trials before juries in which plaintiffs sought punitive damages and prevailed on liability at trial. The table shows a reasonably consistent pattern of higher punitive award rates in jury trials. The overall difference is large, 43.2 percent (34.1 percent weighted) compared to 25.0 percent (20.0 percent weighted), and the weighted jury rate exceeded the weighted judge rate in all case categories except seller plaintiff and conversion (a tie). Although too few cases exist in most categories for precise estimates, the overall pattern is clear and highly statistically significant.
23 Table 9 explores judge-jury differences by controlling for the size of the compensatory award, again limiting the sample to case categories containing at least five efforts to obtain punitive damages for both judge and jury trials. The table shows, for each compensatory award range, the rate of punitive awards for judge trials and jury trials. While accounting for compensatory awards, the pattern of higher rates of punitive awards in jury trials is consistent for the unweighted data but less so for the weighted data. For the unweighted data, except for the small category above $10 million (only one judge trial and five jury trials in the included categories), the punitive award rate in jury trials is higher after controlling for the size of the compensatory award. For the weighted data that account for the sample design, the rate of obtaining punitive awards was higher in judge trials in the reasonably large category of compensatory awards ranging from $50,000 to $99,999 and in the smaller category with awards ranging from $200,000 to $999,999.
42
Prior research suggests that jury and judge punitive award rates differ between personal injury cases and nonpersonal injury cases. In a study that lacked information about whether punitive damages were sought, juries awarded punitive damages at a higher rate than judges in nonpersonal injury cases and judges awarded punitive damages at a higher rate than juries in personal injury cases (Eisenberg et al. 2006) . We therefore divide the information in Table 9 into personal injury cases and nonpersonal injury cases. Table 10 presents the results. Panel A shows the results for personal injury cases and panel B shows the results for nonpersonal injury cases, again limited to case categories containing at least five efforts to obtain punitive damages for both judge and jury trials.
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The results are consistent with results based on data that did not account for whether punitive damages are sought. In personal injury cases, judges awarded punitive damages at a higher rate than juries. The pattern persisted for all compensatory award levels of $50,000 or higher, though the relatively few judge trials suggest caution in interpreting this result. In nonpersonal injury cases, juries awarded punitive damages at a higher rate than judges. This pattern persisted for all compensatory award strata except one weighted stratum. The personal injury case difference is significant at p ¼ 0.061 (weighted); the nonpersonal injury case difference is significant at p < 0.001 (weighted).
The Relation Between Seeking Rates and Obtaining Rates 44
Table 4 above shows that punitive damages were sought at varying rates across locales. One influence on the rate at which punitive damages were awarded may be the selectivity shown by plaintiffs in seeking them. For example, Table 4 shows that punitive damages were sought in only 1.8 percent of 675 tried cases in Cook County Illinois and in 2.7 percent of 365 trials won by plaintiffs. These low punitive-seeking rates are accompanied by a high rate, 50 percent, of obtaining punitive damages in the 10 plaintiff trial wins in which punitive damages were sought. If plaintiffs are more selective about the cases in which they seek punitive damages, they should be expected to obtain them at a higher rate in cases in which they seek them. Rates of seeking punitive damages could be a function of local practice or of state laws that are more or less restrictive about the availability of punitive damages. But the bottom line expectation is that the rate of seeking punitive awards should be inversely associated with the rate at which they are obtained.
45 Figure 1 shows the relation between the seeking and obtaining rate. Each circle in the figure corresponds to a locale's rate of seeking punitive damages on the x-axis and to that locale's rate of obtaining punitive damages on the y-axis. Both rates are expressed as percents. The area of the circles is proportional to the number of cases in which punitive damages were sought in the locale.
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The figure confirms expectations in one respect but not in another. The absence of circles in the figure's upper right quadrant indicates that there were no locales that combined a high rate of seeking punitive damages awards with a high rate of obtaining them. If one limits the analysis to locales with the most cases (the larger circles), in no locale did a punitive damages seeking rate of over 30 percent correspond with an obtaining rate of much more than 30 percent. And all of the locales with award rates of over 60 percent had seeking rates of less than 15 percent. These results are consistent with looser standards for seeking punitive damages resulting in lower rates of obtaining them. But the figure also shows that the rate of obtaining punitive damages was not always closely tied to the rate of seeking them. For low-seeking-rate locales, the range of obtaining rates was broad. In particular, several locales combined low seeking rates with low obtaining rates, and this is true even for some reasonably large locales. We include a variable for the rate of seeking punitive damages in the regression models below.
Regression Models 47
To further assess the pattern of punitive awards, we employed regression analysis for two classes of models. The first class of models assesses whether punitive damages were awarded conditional on their having been sought and on plaintiffs having won at trial. It does not account for the decision whether to seek punitive damages. The second class of models is also conditional on plaintiffs having won at trial but expressly assesses whether punitive damages were sought as a function of the state law characteristics described in Part 4.1. For both classes of models, the dependent variable in analyzing whether punitive damages were awarded is binary-it takes on two values that are, effectively, ''yes'' and ''no,'' coded as 1 or 0.
Multilevel Models of Whether Punitive Damages Were Awarded
48
For binary dependent variables, logistic regression is the standard modeling method (Gelman & Hill 2007; Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000) . In modeling whether punitive damages were awarded, in addition to the factors considered above (case category, locale, compensatory award amount, judge vs. jury trial, personal injury vs. nonpersonal injury cases, and rate of seeking punitive damages), regression models need to account for the sample design. The sample has two distinct features that require consideration.
49
First, if one were to combine into a single model data from 7,682 trials in the 46 large counties and 1,190 trials in the 110 smaller counties, one should account for the differential sampling of the two groups of counties. Accounting for the different sampling rates would be necessary because the penultimate row of Table 4 above shows noticeably different rates of punitive damages in the 110 smaller counties. In the smaller counties, punitive damages were sought in a higher fraction of trials and awarded in a lower fraction of trials than they were in the larger counties. And in most of the smaller counties, there was no case in which punitive damages were sought. Only 36 of the 110 counties reported at least one case with a punitive damages request. Due to the heterogeneity across county groups, we report regression results separately for large and small county groups.
50
Second, the sample is nested in that the individual cases are clustered at the county level and the counties are embedded in larger geographical units, states, the laws of which vary. In this sense, the data are amenable to using hierarchical or multilevel models that account for the structure of the data (Gelman & Hill 2007) .
51 Table 11 reports multilevel logistic regression models of whether punitive damages were awarded in cases in which punitive damages were sought and plaintiffs won. We limit the individual case category dummy variables to case categories with at least five cases of punitive damages sought in both large and small counties. Other case categories are combined into the residual category ''Other.'' Models (1), (3), and (5) show results for large counties and models (2), (4), and (6) show results for small counties. To facilitate judge and jury trial comparisons, models (3) and (4) are limited to case categories with at least five cases in which punitive damages were sought in both judge trials and jury trials. Models (5) and (6) further limit the sample to cases not involving personal injury.
52
A consistent result across the models is the significant association between the compensatory award amount and whether a punitive award was given. In model (6), with only 52 observations, the compensatory award coefficient is not significant but remains positive and large. The results by case category are somewhat inconsistent across the large and small groups of counties. The significantly reduced rate of punitive damages in motor vehicle cases (compared to the reference category of all other case categories) is attributable to the small counties as indicated by comparing models (1) and (2). The coefficient for the intentional tort category is much larger for the small counties.
53
A reasonably consistent result is the increased rate of punitive awards in jury-tried cases. It is statistically significant in the large county models and substantial although insignificant in the smaller county models. The largecounty models that include a jury trial dummy variable suggest that the case-category effects may be collinear with the jury trial effects or that (3) and (5). Model (5) confirms the finding of a higher punitive damages award rate in jury trials in nonpersonal injury cases.
54
To visually assess the probability of a punitive award as a function of the compensatory award, we used logistic regression on the combined large and small county samples and used probability weights to account for the differential sampling rates. The model included only the compensatory award as an explanatory variable and clustered the standard errors by locale. The resulting linear predictions and 95 percent prediction bands for judge and jury trials are shown in Figure 2 . The x-axis is the amount of the compensatory award in a case, employing a logarithmic (base 10) scale. The y-axis is the linear prediction of a punitive damages award that the regression model indicated was associated with the corresponding compensatory award. Note that the data are thin for the high compensatory award levels for judge trials. The overlapping of the prediction bands is evidence, also suggested by some mixed earlier results, that caution is needed in interpreting our findings of judge-jury differences.
Selection Models of the Decision to Seek Punitive Damages and Whether
Punitive Damages Were Awarded
55
Part 4.1 shows that the rate of seeking punitive damages is not uniform across states. State laws and procedural rules restricting punitive damages' availability are strongly associated with whether punitive damages are sought. To account for the influence of state law on whether plaintiffs sought punitive damages, we employ Heckman selection models to model the decision to seek punitive damages simultaneously with whether punitive damages were awarded. For purposes of the selection models, the state laws and rules addressed above have the useful feature that they likely influence the decision whether to seek punitive damages but, once punitives have been sought, they have no direct influence on whether punitive damages were awarded. We add to the selection stage dummy variables for case categories. We also include in some models a dummy variable for Note. Linear predictions were obtained using separate logistic regression models for judge and jury trials. Each model had only the compensatory award as an explanatory variable and was weighted to reflect the differential sampling of large and small counties. Sample is limited to trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
whether the trial was a jury trial. We restrict the sample to cases in which plaintiffs won at trial and again report results separately for large and small counties.
24 Table 12 reports the results. As in Table 11 , we report results separately for large and small counties. Models (1), (3), and (5) show results for large counties and models (2), (4), and (6) show results for small counties. To facilitate judge and jury trial comparisons, models (3) and (4) are limited to case categories with at least five cases in which punitive damages were sought in both judge trials and jury trials. Models (3) and (4) also include a jury trial dummy variable in the award equation. Models (5) and (6) are the same as models (3) and (4) except that they include the jury dummy variable in the selection equation. In models (3) to (6), we aggregate the case category dummy variables in the award equation to match the categories in Table 11 . Other case categories are combined into the residual reference category. The case category dummies are not as reaggregated in the selection equation, where there are more observations.
57
The correlation between the residuals in the award and selection equations, as measured by the parameter r, is not significant in any model. So the selection analysis provides no evidence questioning the single-equation probability-of-award results in Table 11 . And the results are reasonably consistent with those in Table 11 . In the award equation, the coefficient for the compensatory award is always positive and significant for the large counties, and marginally significant or of greater magnitude for the small counties. The jury dummy variable is positive and significant or marginally significant in the award equation. In results not reported here, in models limited to nonpersonal injury cases, the results are essentially the same as in Table 11 's models (5) and (6).
58 Table 12 's selection equations confirm that state laws regulating punitive damages are substantially associated with the rate at which punitive damages are sought. With one exception, all of the state law variables behave as expected. States that effectively disallow punitive damages have a lower probability of a punitive damages request, as do state laws that restrict punitive damages or impose a permission-to-plead requirement. States with high sanction thresholds have a higher probability of a punitive dam- 24 We do not include in the award equation the rate at which punitive damages were sought.
This variable was insignificant in Table 11 and is insignificant in selection models not reported here. ages request than states with a hybrid sanctions threshold, the reference category for sanctions. In small counties, states with a high sanctions threshold have a higher probability of a punitive damages award request compared to states with a low sanctions threshold.
59
The one initially puzzling result is that, in the large county models, states with a high sanctions threshold did not have a higher probability of seeking a punitive award than states with a low sanctions threshold. This result appears to be a consequence of differences between large and small counties in Georgia and Virginia. These two states combine for 85.3 percent of the low sanctions threshold trials in the data (see note 22 above). For the sample of large counties, Table 4 above shows that Georgia and Virginia are represented by Fulton County Superior Court (Atlanta) and Fairfax County (in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area), respectively. These counties differ significantly in the punitive damages seeking rate from other counties in the same states. In Fulton County, 32.5 percent (13 of 40) of the trials contained a punitive damages request compared to 12.9 One key finding is the surprisingly low rate at which punitive damages were sought. As noted above, some of our civil procedure colleagues casually forecast that seeking punitive damages would be overwhelming common. Yet the rate of seeking punitive damages in tried cases was only 11.5 (weighted). Nontrivial portions of the variation in the rates of seeking punitive awards are explained by state law variation in access to punitive damages.
61
The results are consistent with Table 1 above showing that Vidmar and Rose, using a jury verdict reporter, reported only 23.2 Florida cases per year as submitting punitive damages issue to juries. Antolini's results in Hawaii varied by adjudicatory forum. The rate of seeking punitive damages there seemed higher than the rates in this study. But note that Table 4 shows that the rate of seeking punitive awards in Honolulu, the only Hawaii venue in the 2005 data, was 22.2 percent, above the average rate in other counties.
62
One question is whether the seeking rate differs in cases that do not reach trial. As the Supreme Court observed in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the available evidence does not support substantially different rates in cases that settle. 25 As noted above, Eaton, Mustard, and Talarico report an overall seeking rate of 14.7 percent in a comprehensive study of Georgia tort cases. The rate for all 141 cases across all Georgia sites in the 2005 data studied here was 18.4 percent. If anything, this suggests that punitive damages were sought at slightly higher rates in tried cases than in cases that did not reach trial. Herbert Kritzer and Frances Zemans (1998) 26 Kritzer & Zemans (1998, 160) : ''with perhaps one exception, what little systematic evidence we could find does not support the notion'' (emphasis deleted).
by lawyers in seeking punitive damages has not heretofore been so broadly documented.
63
A second key finding is that the punitive award rate was substantial in cases won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. The substantial rate contrasts with low rates of punitive awards in previous data sets lacking information about cases in which punitive damages were sought. The finding of substantial punitive award rates in cases in which they were sought is consistent with the limited prior reports of punitive damages award rates.
64
Table 1 above shows that Vidmar and Rose also found that punitive damages awards were not rare in cases in which the issue of punitive damages was submitted to juries. The table's last row shows that, over the course of a decade, the possibility of punitive damages was submitted to juries in an average of 23.2 cases per year, and that juries awarded punitive damages in an average of 20.8 of those cases per year. This is an overall average of punitive damages being awarded when submitted in 89.7 percent. Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth similarly reported a high rate of obtaining punitive awards in medical malpractice cases. The Vidmar study of North Carolina medical malpractice cases, discussed in Part 2, yielded few punitive award cases. But the rate of punitive awards was not materially different from the rate across the range of punitive award cases in the 2005 Civil Justice Survey data. Our estimates of the rate of punitive awards in Antolini's Hawaii data yielded a state court estimated rate of 37 percent, similar to that found in this study of state courts.
65
A third key finding is the strong association between the size of the compensatory award and the award of punitive damages. Other studies have not stratified by the size of the compensatory award, so direct comparisons of rates by award levels are not feasible. The high rate of punitive awards in the Vidmar-Rose Florida study is similar to the 88.9 percent rate at which punitive damages were awarded in cases in which they were sought in the 2005 Civil Justice Survey data when the compensatory award exceeded $10 million. But the amounts at stake in the Vidmar and Rose data were considerably smaller. The median total award in their data was about $612,000 and the median punitive award was about $152,000 (Vidmar & Rose 2001, 501) . Their high rate of obtaining punitive awards in lower stakes cases may be a consequence of the filtering of cases by the jury verdict reporter they relied on.
We estimated in Part 2 that Vidmar's North Carolina medical malpractice study showed about a 33 to 40 percent chance of an award of punitive damages in medical malpractice cases from 1984 to 1990. This is not inconsistent with the rate found here for fairly low compensatory award cases. The North Carolina medical verdicts included only 3 of 21 cases with awards of $1 million or more and no cases with compensatory awards of $10 million or more (Vidmar 1995, 26-27 (table 3 .1)).
67
A fourth finding of interest is the variation across judge and jury trials. The findings here confirm prior findings of an overall higher rate of punitive awards in jury trials, with the previously noted qualification that the relative rates flip when one moves from nonpersonal injury cases to personal injury cases (Eisenberg et al. 2006 ).
68
The judge-jury findings are the most puzzling of our results. The low punitive-seeking rate is surprising but reasonably consistent with prior studies other than Priest's Alabama results. Associations between the presence of a punitive award and both case categories and compensatory award levels are consistent with a punitive damages framework in which more egregious behavior is more likely to elicit punishment. The judge-jury differences, in contrast, have no such simple explanation. The implausibility of judges being more sympathetic to punitive awards than juries in personal injury cases leads us to suspect that the judge-jury difference in rates is at least partly attributable to how the parties select cases for routing to judge or jury trial, 27 though this suggestion requires further exploration.
We also note the departures from a monolithic judge-jury pattern evidenced by some compensatory award strata have higher weighted punitive award rates in judge trials in Table 9 and by the crossing of lines in Figure 2 .
CONCLUSION 69
The addition to the 2005 Civil Justice Survey of information about whether punitive damages were sought transforms the picture of punitive damages in state courts. Punitive damages were rarely sought in tried cases, were frequently awarded when requested, and were significantly associated with the level of the compensatory award. None of these results has been 27 See Clermont & Eisenberg 1992, explaining higher plaintiff win rate in judge trials in products liability and medical malpractice cases as being partly attributable to the routing of cases between judges and juries.
previously reported in such a comprehensive sample. Both the traditional, casual view that punitive damages are regularly sought, and the empiricallybased view that punitive damages are rarely awarded, and therefore difficult to model, have to be reassessed in light of the 2005 data. These data suggest a heretofore undocumented regularity in the rate at which punitive damages have been awarded.
